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Abstract
A series of empirical studies has documented that job search behavior depends on the
nancial situation of the unemployed. Starting from this observation, we ask how un-
employment insurance policy should optimally take the individual nancial situation into
account. Using a quantitative model with a realistically calibrated unemployment insurance
system, individual consumption-saving decision and moral hazard during job search, we nd
that the optimal policy provides unemployment benets that increase with individual as-
sets. By implicitly raising interest rates, asset-increasing benets encourage self-insurance,
which facilitates consumption smoothing during unemployment, but does not exacerbate
moral hazard for job search. Asset-increasing benets also have desirable properties from
a dynamic perspective, because they emulate key features of the dynamics of constrained
ecient allocations. We nd welfare gains from introducing asset-increasing benets that
are substantial and amount to 1:5% of consumption when comparing steady states and 0:8%
of consumption when taking transition costs into account. More generous replacement rates
or benets targeted to asset-poor households, by contrast, have a negative eect on welfare.
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1 Introduction
This paper starts from the empirical observation that job search behavior depends on the
nancial situation of the unemployed. For instance, Silvio (2006), Card, Chetty, and Weber
(2007), and Lentz (2009) document that higher asset holdings prolong job search, and Chetty
(2008) nds that job seekers in nancially worse situations react more strongly to changes in the
unemployment insurance (UI) system. Motivated by these ndings, we ask how the UI system
should optimally take the individual nancial situation into account. We answer this question
using a quantitative model with a realistically calibrated UI program, individual consumption-
saving decision, and moral hazard during job search.
We nd that the optimal UI system provides benets that increase with individual assets.
The welfare gain of this system over the optimal asset-independent one is sizable and amounts to
1:5 percent of consumption when comparing steady states, and 0:8 percent of consumption when
taking transition costs into account. Intuitively, an asset-increasing benet scheme is preferable
to an asset-independent one, because it enhances precautionary savings during employment and
thereby allows additional consumption smoothing during unemployment without worsening
moral hazard. By contrast, additional insurance coming from higher replacement rates or
benets targeted to asset-poor households has a negative eect on welfare, because such systems
crowd out self-insurance and exacerbate moral hazard by distorting the returns to job search.
Furthermore, asset-increasing UI benets have attractive properties from a dynamic perspective,
because|as proposed in the literature on optimal dynamic contracts|benets decrease with
the duration of present and past unemployment spells in that case.
Due to the complexity of the government's problem in this setup, we refrain from a charac-
terization of the second best allocation and follow the large strand of the literature that uses
calibrated models to study the optimal policy for a restricted class of policy instruments (Ram-
sey optimal policy).1 We build an incomplete markets model in which workers are randomly
laid o and exert unobservable eort to inuence their chances of nding a job. Workers ac-
cumulate or decumulate a risk-free asset during employment and unemployment subject to a
borrowing constraint. The asset distribution is thus endogenous and depends, in particular,
on the structure of the UI system. To keep the analysis tractable, we restrict attention to UI
1See Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992), Wang and Williamson (2002), and Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu, and Sahin
(2002), for example.
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systems that condition only on asset holdings, but not directly on the employment history.2
Although potentially restrictive, such systems already achieve sizable welfare gains.
In the quantitative analysis we put strong discipline on the model's parameters. We calibrate
the model to match the empirical evidence for U.S. job nding and job loss rates, as well as
the asset holdings of displaced workers (Gruber, 2001), the estimated change in marginal utility
during unemployment (Chetty, 2008), and the elasticity of the job nding rate with respect
to the replacement rate (Krueger and Meyer, 2002). Starting from the calibrated benchmark
economy we proceed in two steps. In the rst step, we show that optimizing the replacement
rate of the UI system leads to negligible welfare gains relative to the benchmark system. This
nding is in line with results by Chetty (2008), who using a dierent model and approach also
nds that the current U.S. system is close to optimal in terms of the replacement rate. In
the second step, we go beyond asset-independent UI systems and explore simple parametric
functional forms of asset tests. We maximize social welfare over a large parameter space and
show that substantial welfare improvements are possible if asset-increasing UI benets replace
the current asset-independent system.3 The gains remain large even when we take the transition
towards the higher steady state asset stock into account. We also show that additional asset
heterogeneity generated by heterogeneous time discount factors does not alter the result that
asset-increasing benets are optimal.
The reason for the optimality of asset-increasing benets becomes apparent once we distin-
guish between the two purposes of UI, namely providing liquidity in situations without income
and encouraging job search (Chetty, 2008; Shimer and Werning, 2008). There is a general
conict between these two objectives: by providing UI benets, the government increases the
worker's cash-at-hand during unemployment, but simultaneously distorts the worker's returns
to job search, since the income gap between work and unemployment is reduced. For asset-
independent UI systems, the rst step of our analysis shows that an increase of the replacement
rate beyond fty percent yields gains from improved liquidity provision that are about as large
as the costs due to distorted job search incentives. However, when benets are made asset-
2For simplication, we assume that assets are observable for the UI agency without costs. How costly it is
to monitor asset holdings in practice remains an open question. Yet, the fact that asset-tested social transfer
programs are widespread suggests that the costs of verifying asset holdings are limited. Furthermore, under the
optimal UI system in our model agents have no incentive to underreport assets, but only to overreport, and the
latter is probably a lot easier to detect.
3The functional forms also allow for transfers targeted to the asset-poor, i.e. benets that decrease with assets.
We show that asset-decreasing benets lead to welfare losses.
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dependent, liquidity provision and search incentives can be decoupled to some extent. Since
asset-increasing benets implicitly raise the return on assets, they generate extra liquidity for
unemployed workers via increased private asset accumulation prior to job loss. This improve-
ment of the liquidity situation is achieved without changing the average level of benets, which
loosely speaking means that the average eect on job search incentives and publicly provided
liquidity amounts to zero.4
Besides, the way in which public transfers are allocated over time changes in a positive
way when UI benets are asset-increasing. As the agent's asset stock tends to fall during
unemployment and grow during employment, the asset stock is a summary statistic of the
agent's employment history. Hence, when benets increase with assets, the duration of present
and past unemployment spells has a negative impact on the generosity of public transfers. This
property is commonly found to be optimal in the dynamic contracting literature, see Shavell and
Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997, 2009). Yet, in line with Wang and Williamson
(2002) and Shimer and Werning (2008), we nd that such considerations are quantitatively less
important for social welfare. Intuitively, when agents have access to a savings technology, much
of the benet dynamics can be counteracted|in particular when benets are decreasing over
the course of the unemployment spell. All in all, the dynamic allocation of benets induced by
asset-dependence therefore accounts for only a small part of the total welfare improvement.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst that delivers an analysis of asset-
tested UI in a model with endogenous asset accumulation. Our approach is based on the works
by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002), who use quantitative
incomplete markets models to study optimal UI systems without asset tests. While Hansen
and Imrohoroglu (1992) explore to what extent optimal replacement rates vary with the degree
of moral hazard, Wang and Williamson (2002) investigate the eect of dynamic benets and
experience rating for employers.
In line with the work by Rendahl (2011), our results point out the importance of individual
asset holdings as a state for UI policy. Yet, due to key dierences in modeling assumptions,
we reach very dierent conclusions on how this state should be used. Rendahl (2011) stud-
4In principle, abstracting from search incentives and private asset accumulation, it would be good to provide
liquidity especially to unemployed workers with low assets, since for them the need is most severe. As our results
show, however, this leads to a welfare reduction, because it crowds out liquidity coming from private sources and
moreover punishes workers with short unemployment spells (indicating high search eort).
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ies asset-dependent UI in a model with a single unemployed agent who experiences a single
unemployment spell. In this setup, the distribution of assets at job loss is exogenous and ho-
mogeneous by assumption, and therefore the UI system has no eect on precautionary savings
behavior. Moreover, assets include no information on the agent's history prior to the current
unemployment spell. These peculiarities of the single spell model seem to matter a lot for the
results: Rendahl (2011) nds that optimal unemployment benets decrease with assets, while
we conclude the opposite.
Our results also dier from the analysis by Lentz (2009), who studies individual unem-
ployment insurance schemes in a heterogeneous population. Taking the distribution of types
and assets as given, Lentz (2009) concludes that unemployment benets should be a negative
function of initial assets. Due to the timing convention in that paper, asset tests have no con-
sequences for precautionary saving decisions, which as in Rendahl (2011) mutes the liquidity
channel highlighted in our analysis. Besides, in contrast to our model, unemployment benets
are indexed to initial assets and are by construction unrelated to the later evolution of assets.
Finally, our results are related to the work by Shimer and Werning (2008), who study
the optimal timing of UI benets in a single-spell model of unemployment where agents have
access to a savings technology. They nd that UI systems with a simple, time-independent
replacement rate are very close to optimal in this environment. Our results show that when
asset accumulation prior to job loss and multiple unemployment spells are taken into account,
this result no longer applies. Indeed, we nd that UI systems that also consider the agent's
behavior during employment can lead to large welfare gains.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2 we describe the model. We describe our cal-
ibration, solve for the optimal policy and present the results in Section 3. Section 4 provides
some discussion and a sensitivity analysis of the results. We provide conclusions in Section 5.
2 Model
There is a continuum of mass 1 of ex ante identical agents. At each date t 2 f0; 1; : : : ;1g,
the agent's employment state t is an element of the set  = fE;U; Sg, where E stands for
employment, U for unemployment, and S for social assistance. Employment states are stochastic
and transition probabilities between states depend on the (unobservable) eort exerted by the
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agent. If the agent exerts eort et and is in state  at time t, then her probability of being in
state 0 in period t+ 1 is denoted by
Prob
 
t+1 = 
0 j t = ; et

= 0(et):
In each period, the agent derives utility u(ct) from consumption ct and disutility (et) from
eort et, where u : R+ ! R is strictly increasing and strictly concave and  : R+ ! R is
strictly increasing and (weakly) convex. Given prices (r; w), discount factor  2 (0; 1), utility
functions u and , and the above specication of uncertainty, the agent chooses a consumption
sequence fctg1t=0, a sequence of asset holdings fat+1g1t=0, and a sequence of eort levels fetg1t=0
to maximize expected discounted life-time utility:
max
fct;at+1;etg
E
" 1X
t=0
t (u(ct)  (et))
#
(1)
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + y(at; t)
at+1  a; ct  0; et  0
a0; 0 given
where y(at; t) denotes the agent's income in period t, r is the return on assets between periods
t and t+ 1, and a  0 represents a borrowing constraint.
If the agent is employed (t = E), she receives a wage w and pays proportional income taxes
at rate  . In state t = U , she receives unemployment benets b(at). Finally, in state t = S the
agent is unemployed and receives social assistance transfers z. The agent's income (excluding
interest income) in period t is hence given by
y(at; t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
(1  )w if t = E;
b(at) if t = U;
z if t = S:
The government provides unemployment benets and social assistance benets and levies a
proportional tax  on labor income. Unemployment benets b(a) may depend on the agent's
current asset position a, while social assistance benets z are asset-independent for simplicity.
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The government runs a balanced budget in each period, i.e., the government policy must satisfy
w
Z
at
dt(at; E) =
Z
at
b(at)dt(at; U) + z
Z
at
dt(at; S) 8t (2)
where t denotes the distribution of agents over asset holdings A = [a;1) and employment
states  = fE;U; Sg at time t.
The general setup of the model is not accessible for a quantitative analysis. We will therefore
make some standard assumptions on functional forms.
Assumption 1. The agent's period utility function is given by
u(c)  (e) =
8><>: (1  )

c1 
1    e

;  6= 1;   1;
(1  ) (log(c)  e) ;  = 1;   1:
Since empirical knowledge on the extent to which workers can inuence their layo risk is
very limited, we will model layos as exogenous.5 In addition, we assume that the job search
technology of the agent is the same during social assistance and unemployment benet receipt.
Assumption 2. Transition probabilities from employment to employment (EE) are independent
of the agent's eort:
EE(e) = EE ;
with EE > 0. Transition probabilities from unemployment to employment (UE) and from social
assistance to employment (SE) depend on eort in the following way:
UE(e) = 1  exp(  e); SE(e) = 1  exp(  e):
To economize on the number of state variables, we assume that the duration of unemploy-
ment benets is stochastic.6 An agent who received unemployment benets at time t   1 and
5From a technical point of view, introducing layo probabilities that depend on eort would not be dicult.
However, in such a setup wealthy workers would ceteris paribus lose their job more often than poor ones. As a
consequence, the asset distribution of job losers would dominate that of employed workers, which is contradicted
by the ndings from Gruber (2001). The fact that wealth matters for transitions from unemployment to employ-
ment, on the other hand, is well-established empirically. Silvio (2006) and Lentz (2009), among others, document
that wealthier individuals ceteris paribus take longer to nd a job. Our model will endogenously generate this
feature.
6By making the duration of unemployment benets stochastic, we substantially reduce the computational
complexity of the problem, but nonetheless capture the fact that benets are paid for a limited time only. If the
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continues to be unemployed at time t will receive unemployment benets with probability p
and social assistance transfers with probability 1   p. By contrast, an unemployed agent who
received social assistance transfers at time t   1 and continues to be unemployed at time t
will receive social assistance transfers (and no unemployment benets) with certainty. We will
later choose p = 5=6, which means that unemployed agents, in expectation, have access to
unemployment benets during the rst 6 months of their spell.
Combining these functional forms with the above rules for UI eligibility gives rise to the
following matrix of transition probabilities over states (E;U; S):
0BBBB@
EE 1  EE 0
1  exp(  e) exp(  e)p exp(  e) (1  p)
1  exp(  e) 0 exp(  e)
1CCCCA (3)
where the rst, second, and third row contain the transition probabilities for an agent in state
E, U , and S, respectively.
The following assumption allows us to solve the agent's decision problem using rst-order
conditions.7
Assumption 3. Unemployment benets b(a) are dierentiable on [a;1).
2.1 Equilibrium
Recall  = fE;U; Sg and denote the asset space by A = [a;1). The agent's problem has
a recursive structure and we restrict attention to recursive policies from now on. We adopt
standard notation and denote current period's variables without time subscript and next period's
variables by a prime, e.g.  and 0 for the employment state in the current and the next period.
The agent's Bellman equation reads
v(a; ) = max
fa0;eg
u((1 + r)a+ y(a; )  a0)  (e) + 
X
02
v(a0; 0)0(e) (4)
s.t. e  0; a0  a; (1 + r)a+ y(a; )  a0  0:
duration of unemployment benets were deterministic, we would have to introduce the current duration of the
unemployment spell as an additional state variable.
7We numerically verify that the solution to the agent's rst-order conditions is indeed a solution to the agent's
decision problem by re-optimizing the agent's decision using grid search and value function iteration.
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A (recursive) steady state equilibrium consists of a value function v : A   ! R, an asset
policy function a0 : A! R+, an eort policy function e : A! R, a government policy
(b(); z; ) and an invariant distribution  on the state space A such that:
1. v, a0, and e solve the agent's problem (1) given prices (w; r) and the government policy.
2. The government's budget constraint (2) is satised.
3.  is an invariant distribution given decision functions e; a0 and transition matrix (3).
3 Results
We take a model period to be one month. We normalize the monthly wage rate to 1 and set the
interest rate to match an annual return on assets of 4%. The parameters  and EE are chosen
to replicate the average job nding and job loss rate in the United States in the period from
1980 to 2005.8 The target for  is median assets (gross nancial wealth divided by past monthly
earnings) of newly displaced workers reported by Gruber (2001). For reasons specied below,
we set the parameters of the agent's utility function to  = 2,  = 1. The benchmark UI policy
consists of an asset-independent replacement rate of 0:5, b(a) = 0:5(1   )w, which represents
the average replacement rate currently eective in the United States.9 Social assistance benets
z are chosen according to the average transfer received by a single adult with no children in
the 60th month of unemployment in the U.S., which gives z = 0:08(1  )w.10 The tax rate is
 = 0:0211 and is set to balance the government's budget.
The calibration generates the following parameters: EE = 0:9855,  = 0:0472,  = 0:974.
With these parameters, the steady state equilibrium matches the calibration targets as shown
in Table 1. The corresponding consumption and eort decisions can be found in Figure 1.
Note that the monthly discount factor,  = 0:974, corresponds to an annual discount factor
of approximately 0:73. In other words, in order to rationalize the savings behavior found in
8The rates are derived using monthly worker ows from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for all workers
aged 16 years and older from 1980 to 2005. Details are available upon request.
9According to the OECD, the net replacement rate during the rst six months of unemployment in the U.S. in
2009 amounts to 0.49. This number is calculated for single persons with no children and averaged over three
stylized pre-unemployment income levels. See www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/21/49021188.xlsx for further details.
10The social assistance level of 0:08 is the net replacement rate in the 60th month of unemployment in the
U.S. in 2009, calculated for single persons with no children and averaged over three stylized pre-unemployment
income levels. See www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/19/49021050.xlsx for further details. Benets include social
assistance (SNAP) and housing benets.
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Table 1: Calibration
model target
job nding rate 27:0% 27:0%
job loss rate 1:5% 1:5%
median assets of job losers 1:2 1:2
Notes: Calibration result. The rst column gives the data target, the second column the model predicted
value of the data target, and the third column the empirical value of the calibration target. The sources
for the empirical values of the data targets are given in the main text.
the data, we need to assume that workers typically aected by job displacement risk are very
impatient. Given that job displacements occur more frequently for low income jobs, the high
degree of impatience can be at least partially explained by the nding that poor households in
the United States discount the future more heavily than rich ones; compare Lawrance (1991).
For a comprehensive analysis of the savings behavior of impatient agents, we refer the reader
to the works by Deaton (1991) or Carroll (1992), for instance.11 As a robustness exercise, we
explore a version of our model in which time-discounting is less strong in Appendix A. The
results are qualitatively the same.12
Our choice of the coecient of relative risk aversion,  = 2, turns out to be well in line
with the relative change in marginal utility during unemployment estimated by Chetty (2008).
Consider the expression
u0
 
cU
  u0  cE
u0 (cU )
(5)
where cE denotes consumption during employment and cU represents consumption when receiv-
ing UI benets. We compute this expression by comparing the consumption levels of employed
and unemployed agents with identical asset positions. We then average over asset holdings,
putting weights according to the asset distribution of the unemployed. While Chetty estimates
(a dynamic version of) expression (5) to be roughly 0:6, our model generates a number of 0.64.
To check the plausibility of the eort cost parameter,  = 1, we examine the elasticity of
11In principle, it would also be possible to change the calibration so that the return on assets is much lower,
and maybe even negative. This would decrease saving incentives, so that agents would accumulate less nancial
assets and less time discounting would be needed to match the calibration targets. This seems attractive in so far
as returns on assets used for consumption smoothing might yield a lower return in reality. However, this would
also imply having very low or negative interest rates for the government, which is highly undesirable, whereas a
model with dierent interest rates for agents and the government would raise additional complications that we
want to avoid in our analysis. We therefore opt for the case where savings incentives are low due to strong time
discounting, similar to the ideas in Deaton (1991) or Carroll (1992), for instance.
12However, with a high value for  it becomes virtually impossible to jointly match the calibration targets for
asset holdings, elasticity of the job nding rate, and drop in marginal utility during unemployment.
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the job nding rate with respect to UI benets. Intuitively, the higher the convexity of eort
costs, the smaller is the reaction of eort to changes in benet generosity. With  = 1, at the
benchmark UI system the elasticity of the job nding rate with respect to the replacement rate
is approximately 0:48.13 This number is closely in line with the results by Chetty (2008), who
estimates an elasticity of 0:53. Most estimates surveyed by Krueger and Meyer (2002) fall into
a similar range.
3.1 Asset-independent UI
We now hold the parameters of the model xed and vary the replacement rate of the UI system,
while adapting the tax rate to keep the government budget balanced. Table 2 displays mean
asset holdings, unemployment, taxes and welfare for the steady state equilibria associated with
various replacement rates. We also report the utilitarian welfare gain relative to the benchmark
policy, expressed in terms of equivalent variation of consumption of the benchmark economy.
Table 2: Steady states for various asset-independent replacement rates
replacement assets unemployment tax welfare change
80% 0.73 6.2% 3.9% -0.38%
70% 0.84 5.8% 3.2% -0.18%
60% 0.98 5.4% 2.6% -0.06%
50% 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
40% 1.31 4.8% 1.6% 0.02%
30% 1.53 4.6% 1.2% 0.00%
20% 1.78 4.4% 0.8% -0.03%
Notes: Results of varying the replacement rate starting from the benchmark economy. Column 1 gives
the dierent replacement rates, column 2 the average asset holdings in the economy, column 3 the
unemployment rate, column 4 the tax rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed as equivalent
variation in steady state consumption generated by moving from the benchmark economy to the economy
with the new replacement rate.
Using utilitarian steady state welfare as our criterion, the optimal replacement rate is 40
percent. The welfare gain relative to the benchmark policy is negligible, however, as steady
state welfare raises by only 0.02 percent in consumption equivalent terms. The benchmark
replacement rate of 50 percent is hence very close to optimal.
The benchmark government policy yields a substantial welfare increase relative to autarky.
Table 3 shows the welfare eects of eliminating unemployment insurance and/or social assis-
13More precisely, a ten percent increase in the replacement rate (from 0:5 to 0:55) reduces the job nding rate
of agents receiving UI benets by roughly 4.8 percent in our model (from 0:2233 to 0:2125).
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tance. Relative to the benchmark policy, autarky (no UI, no social assistance) entails steady
state welfare losses of 0.64 percent in consumption equivalent terms.
Table 3: Steady states for the benchmark policy, no UI, no social assistance, and autarky
policy assets unemployment tax welfare change
benchmark 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
no social assistance 1.35 4.6% 1.9% -0.35%
no UI 2.50 4.1% 0.1% -0.25%
autarky 2.56 3.8% 0.0% -0.64%
Notes: Results of eliminating unemployment insurance benets, social assistance benets, or both. The
rst column describes the policy experiment, column 2 gives the average asset holdings in the economy,
column 3 the unemployment rate, column 4 the tax rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed as
equivalent variation in steady state consumption.
3.2 Linear asset-dependent UI
We now allow UI benets b(a) to depend on assets, holding the tax rate  = 0:0211 xed at
the benchmark level.14 For now, we restrict ourselves to systems where the replacement rate
depends on assets in a linear way,
b(a)
(1  )w = 1a+ 2: (6)
We explore various slopes 1 and choose the intercept 2 to preserve budget balance. Recall
that the social assistance replacement rate is set to 0.08. We therefore allow for intercept values
2 2 [0:08; 1].
Table 4 shows that steady state welfare increases in 1, the slope of the benet scheme. We
note that the potential welfare gain of linking benets linearly to assets corresponds to roughly
1.3 percent of steady state consumption. This gain is more than twice as large as the gain of
moving the economy from autarky to the benchmark policy. In addition, we nd that systems
where benets decrease with assets (the conventional denition of an asset test) bring welfare
losses compared to the benchmark system with asset-independent benets. The optimal linear
asset-dependent UI system is given by parameters 1 = 0:138, 2 = 0:084. These parameters
are at the corner. If we increase the slope 1 even further, it becomes impossible to nd an
intercept 2 2 [0:08; 1] such that the government budget is balanced.
14We also explored asset-dependent benets for alternative tax rates. The results are very similar to the ones
reported for  = 0:0211. Moreover, this tax rate is approximately optimal. See Appendix C for further details.
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Table 4: Steady states for linear asset-dependent replacement rates
1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
-0.150 0.615 0.57 4.7% -0.88%
-0.100 0.590 0.72 4.8% -0.62%
-0.050 0.553 0.89 4.9% -0.33%
0.000 0.500 1.13 5.1% 0.00%
0.050 0.419 1.47 5.3% 0.38%
0.100 0.283 2.02 5.7% 0.86%
0.138 0.084 2.83 6.1% 1.34%
Notes: Results for replacement rates that are linear in assets. The rst column gives the slope of the
replacement rate with respect to assets, column 2 the intercept, column 3 the average asset holdings in
the economy, column 4 the unemployment rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed as equivalent
variation in steady state consumption generated by moving from the benchmark economy to the economy
with asset-dependent replacement rates. The tax rate  = 0:0211 is xed at the benchmark level.
Under the optimal linear asset-dependent system, agents with zero assets face a replacement
rate equal to that under social assistance. For the median job loser, having assets of around 3.1,
the replacement rate equals 50 percent during the rst month of unemployment. Figure 2 shows
the shape of UI benets under this system. Figure 3 displays the corresponding consumption
decisions and job nding probabilities.
Benet schemes that increase with assets generate higher unemployment rates than schemes
with asset-independent or asset-decreasing benets. This is simply a peculiarity of our policy
experiment. Recall that we x the tax rate, which implies that the amount of government
transfers is approximately the same for all policies. Since asset-increasing UI systems implicitly
subsidize pre-cautionary saving and thereby raise steady state asset holdings, the total amount
of resources available during unemployment is higher for those systems. Quite straightforwardly,
job nding rates are thus lower. It would not be dicult to reduce the tax rate and the average
level of benets such that the job nding rate of the asset-increasing UI system matches the
rate of the benchmark policy. Appendix C shows that this does not yield higher welfare.
3.3 Nonlinear asset-dependent UI
We now consider a more exible functional form for UI benets. This allows us to locally
increase the slope of benets even further than in the experiments conducted above. Given that
the optimal linear benet function was the one that had the highest possible slope subject to
obtaining budget balance, there might be room for a further welfare improvement.
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Since asset-decreasing benet schemes lead to welfare losses in the linear case, we restrict
ourselves to a class of increasing functions,
b(a)
(1  )w = 1  0:92 exp

  (a=2)1

; (7)
where 1; 2 are positive parameters. The class of functions in (7) includes S-shaped and concave
benet schemes, as well as schemes that are approximately linear over some range. Intuitively,
the slope parameter 1 determines the sensitivity of benets as we move from the center of the
asset distribution to the tails. Notice that benets exceed the social assistance level of 0.08 and
are bounded above by 1 for all parameter values.
We examine dierent values for 1 and choose 2 to ensure that the government budget
is balanced. Table 5 shows the results of various parameter values for this functional form.
Figure 4 displays the shape of UI benets under the optimal parameters, while Figure 5 shows
the corresponding consumption function and optimal job nding probabilities. The steady
state welfare gain relative to the benchmark policy is substantial and amounts to an equivalent
variation of 1.56 percent of period consumption. Yet, this gain is only slightly larger than the
one obtained by the optimal linear benet system. Besides, we nd that steeper slopes of the
benet function are not necessarily better. For functions with parameter values 1 higher than
the optimal level, 1 = 2, the slope of benets at the mean of the asset distribution is steeper
(and mean asset holdings are higher), but steady state welfare is lower.
Table 5: Steady states for various nonlinear asset-dependent replacement rates
1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
1.0 4.378 2.50 5.9% 1.16%
1.5 4.500 3.04 6.2% 1.43%
2.0 4.815 3.48 6.5% 1.56%
2.5 5.200 3.56 6.7% 1.06%
Notes: Results for various asset-dependent replacement rates using the functional form described in
equation (7). The rst two columns display the parameter values, column states 3 the average asset
holdings in the economy, column 4 the unemployment rate, and column 5 the welfare change expressed
as equivalent variation in steady state consumption generated by moving from the benchmark economy to
the economy with asset-dependent replacement rates. The tax rate  = 0:0211 is xed at the benchmark
level.
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4 Discussion
The quantitative results from the previous section have shown that linking the UI replacement
rate to individual assets generates a substantial welfare gain relative to asset-independent sys-
tems. Most importantly, we have found that the replacement rate should be an increasing
function of assets. The following discussion identies three economic forces for this result. First
of all, asset-increasing UI programs improve the liquidity situation of unemployed workers by
enhancing precautionary savings prior to job loss. Secondly, asset-increasing UI programs have
consequences for the way in which UI benets are allocated over time; these dynamic consider-
ations turn out to be relatively less important, however. Finally, asset-increasing UI programs
yield higher interest income, as the steady state asset stock is larger.
The rst key economic force behind our results becomes straightforward once we dierentiate
between the moral hazard eect and the liquidity eect of UI. As emphasized by Chetty (2008),
UI programs play two very distinct roles.15 On the one hand, they narrow the income gap
between employment and unemployment. This distorts the relative price between work and
leisure, and results in moral hazard so that unemployed workers substitute from search eort
towards leisure. On the other hand, UI programs alleviate borrowing constraints by raising the
worker's wealth during unemployment. This second channel, referred to as the liquidity eect,
also leads to a reduction in search eort. Although both the liquidity and the moral hazard
eect inuence the agent's search behavior in a similar direction, their welfare consequences are
very dierent. Liquidity provision is a socially benecial response to credit market imperfection,
while the moral hazard eect resulting from the price distortion is detrimental to social welfare.
Ideally, a UI program should generate liquidity without generating moral hazard. In a model
with endogenous asset accumulation, the UI program aects the liquidity situation of unem-
ployed workers not only directly through transfers during unemployment, but also indirectly
by changing the worker's precautionary saving behavior prior to job loss. For standard, asset-
independent UI programs, public transfers have an ambiguous eect on the liquidity situation,
because any increase in the generosity of UI will crowd out precautionary savings. Systems with
asset-increasing UI benets, however, implicitly raise the rate of return on assets and thereby
enhance precautionary savings while keeping taxes and hence the average generosity of trans-
15Shimer and Werning (2008) also discuss a dual role of UI with a slightly dierent focus.
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fers unchanged. This generates extra liquidity via private asset accumulation without changing
the average level of benets, which loosely speaking means that the average eect on publicly
provided liquidity and moral hazard amounts to zero.
Moreover, if we look at the dynamic distribution of moral hazard eects, we nd that asset-
increasing UI benets have some additional desirable properties. As long as agents accumulate
assets during employment and decrease assets during unemployment, assets are a summary
statistic of the agent's employment history, where a high asset stock signals short (and/or infre-
quent) periods of unemployment. Asset-increasing UI benets therefore have the feature that
benets decrease with the duration of present and past unemployment spells, which is com-
monly found to be optimal in the dynamic contracting literature; see Shavell and Weiss (1979),
and Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009). Furthermore, the magnitude of asset accumulation and
decumulation tends to be larger in systems with asset-increasing benets, so that consumption
during employment decreases more strongly with the duration of previous unemployment spells.
Hence, UI systems with asset-increasing benets create more signicant `re-employment taxes'
in the sense of Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). In these two ways asset-increasing UI benets
emulate the dynamics of constrained ecient allocations, which complements the eciency gain
resulting from improved liquidity provision. Yet, dynamic considerations seem to account for
only a small part of the welfare gains of asset-increasing UI programs. In models closely related
to the present one, Wang and Williamson (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2008) document
that, whenever agents have access to a savings technology, exible dynamic benet systems do
not yield large welfare gains relative to time-independent systems. Appendix B shows that the
same logic applies to the present setup. Therefore, the dynamics created by asset-dependent
UI programs explain only a relatively small part of the total welfare eects.
Finally, by raising the steady state asset stock, asset-increasing UI systems generate extra
interest income, compare Table 4, so that a part of the welfare change results simply from higher
mean income. For instance, when comparing the benchmark economy to the economy with
optimal linear asset-dependent benets, we observe that the change in the asset stock generates
additional interest income equivalent to approximately 0:6 percent of period consumption, while
the total welfare gain amounts to 1:34 percent of period consumption.
For a conclusive welfare analysis, the steady state eects discussed above have to be com-
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pared to the costs of reaching the new steady state. The following two sections show that the
welfare gains of asset-increasing UI systems need to be corrected downwards when the transi-
tion phase is taken into account. Yet, transition eects will not invalidate the basic insight that
optimal UI benets are increasing in individual asset holdings.
4.1 A simple transition experiment
To approximate the consequences of an optimal transition, we suppose throughout this section
that the government can arbitrarily change the asset distribution at the time of a policy reform
using individual specic lump-sum transfers. There are many possible ways to design those
transfers. However, in terms of the costs they are all identical: if mean assets in the pre-reform
steady state are given by aold and mean assets in the post-reform steady state are anew, then
the lump-sum transfers can be nanced by the government by repaying r(anew   aold) in every
period. We add this cost or revenue to the government's budget constraint and keep the budget
balanced by adjusting UI benets accordingly.
In this experiment, the economy immediately jumps from the pre-reform steady state to
the post-reform steady state. Yet, the costs of changing the asset stock are taken into account,
because they enter the government's budget and are repaid over the future. Using this approach,
the welfare eects of policies that raise the steady state asset distribution will be corrected
downwards. Table 6 displays mean asset holdings, unemployment, taxes and welfare changes
for various asset-independent UI systems taking into account the transition costs outlined above.
For asset-independent systems, we nd that the optimal replacement rate coincides with the
benchmark rate of 50 percent.
Table 7 considers UI benets that are linear in assets. Conrming the results from Section
3.2, we nd that welfare is increasing in the slope of UI benets even when the transition costs
described above are included. Since part of the tax revenue is used to nance the change in
the steady state asset stock, the benet functions from Section 3.2 are no longer feasible. The
highest possible slope of benets is now given by 1 = 0:12, and leads to a welfare gain of 0:79
percent of period consumption.16
16By contrast, when the costs of the lump-sum transfers to change the capital stock are ignored (as in Section
3.2), the intercept of the benet function with slope 1 = 0:12 can be increased from 2 = 0:08 to a level of
2 = 0:20. At the same time, the welfare gain rises to 1:09 percent of consumption.
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Table 6: Steady states for various asset-independent replacement rates. Transition costs as
outlined in Section 4.1 are included.
replacement assets unemployment tax welfare change
80% 0.73 6.2% 3.8% -0.27%
70% 0.84 5.8% 3.1% -0.10%
60% 0.98 5.4% 2.6% -0.02%
50% 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
40% 1.31 4.8% 1.7% -0.03%
30% 1.52 4.6% 1.3% -0.10%
20% 1.77 4.4% 1.0% -0.20%
Notes: In this transition experiment, the government immediately moves the economy to the post-reform
steady state using individual specic lump sum transfers. The costs or revenues of these transfers enter
the government's budget and are repaid over the future.
Table 7: Steady states for linear asset-dependent replacement rates. Transition costs as out-
lined in Section 4.1 are included.
1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
-0.150 0.658 0.51 4.8% -0.71%
-0.100 0.621 0.67 4.9% -0.49%
-0.050 0.571 0.87 5.0% -0.26%
0.000 0.500 1.13 5.1% 0.00%
0.050 0.394 1.51 5.2% 0.30%
0.100 0.210 2.16 5.4% 0.64%
0.120 0.081 2.62 5.5% 0.79%
Notes: In this transition experiment, the government immediately moves the economy to the post-
reform steady state using individual specic lump sum transfers. The costs or revenues of these transfers
enter the government's budget and are repaid over the future. The tax rate  = 0:0211 is xed at the
benchmark level.
4.2 An explicit transition phase
If we rule out individual specic lump-sum transfers, the steady state asset distribution induced
by a policy reform cannot be implemented instantaneously. It will thus take some time before
individual saving decisions have moved the asset distribution to its new steady state.
The simplest way of modeling an explicit transition would be to posit that the UI reform is
not anticipated and takes eect immediately at the time it is announced. For the introduction
of asset-increasing benets, however, this would be the worst possible approach. During the
transition phase, agents would not only have to give up consumption to build a higher asset
stock, they would also face very little insurance against unemployment. For instance, at the
linear UI policy that maximizes steady state welfare in Section 3.2, the replacement rate at
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average pre-reform asset holdings amounts to little more than 20 percent and so it would take
a signicant amount of time before the agent is reasonably well insured against unemployment.
Indeed, if we perform this exercise, we nd that the steady state welfare gain transforms into a
welfare loss when taking the transition phase into account.17
Underinsurance during the transition phase can be avoided by introducing asset-increasing
benets on top of the benchmark system. Specically, we carry out the following exercise. We
set the intercept of the benet function to 2 = 0:5 and then explore dierent values for the
slope 1. At the same time, we adjust the tax rate to keep the government budget balanced
(in present value terms, including budget eects of the transition). As usual, we assume that
agents do not anticipate the policy reform until it takes eect. The results of this experiment are
shown in Table 8. We see that asset-increasing UI systems improve welfare by a consumption
equivalent variation of up to 0:12 percent. Dierent from the experiments in Section 3.2, welfare
is no longer monotonic in the slope parameter 1, because higher slopes now require higher taxes
and higher average benets. The tax and benet levels therefore become ineciently high when
slopes are too steep.
Table 8: Linear asset-dependent replacement rates. Welfare includes the transition phase.
1 2 assets unemployment tax welfare change
0.000 0.50 1.13 5.1% 2.1% 0.00%
0.025 0.50 1.22 5.3% 2.3% 0.08%
0.050 0.50 1.33 5.6% 2.5% 0.12%
0.075 0.50 1.48 6.0% 2.9% 0.11%
0.100 0.50 1.71 6.7% 3.5% -0.07%
Notes: The replacement rate is bounded below by fty percent for all asset levels. In other words,
asset-increasing benets are introduced on top of the benchmark UI system.
Finally, we would like to remark that there are several alternative ways of limiting the harm
of the transition phase when an asset-increasing UI policy is introduced. For instance, one
could pay extra transfers to agents who become unemployed shortly after the policy reform.
Alternatively, the policy could be changed gradually, or during an intermediate period a public
loan scheme could provide additional liquidity for the unemployed.18
17Details are available upon request.
18If public loans for unemployed were permanently available so that in eect the borrowing constraint is
shifted, then this would change only the level of assets, but not the available liquidity, because agents in the
model accumulate liquidity (distance to the borrowing constraint) and not assets. Hence, the introduction of
public loans does not increase liquidity in the steady state. Further results are available upon request.
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4.3 Heterogeneous discount factors
In its basic version, the model generates less asset heterogeneity among job losers than we nd in
the data documented by Gruber (2001). In fact, a larger degree of heterogeneity might change
the case in favor of asset-decreasing benets, because then transfers targeted to agents with
very low liquidity might possibly become more important. To see how our results change with
more asset heterogeneity, we follow the approach by Krusell and Smith (1998) and generate a
larger variation in the asset distribution using heterogeneous time discount factors.
Throughout this section, we explore a version of the model in which agents have discount
factors  2 f1; 2; 3g. The share of agents with discount factor i equals one third for
i = 1; 2; 3. Discount factors are permanent. We recalibrate the parameters of the model to
match the targets from Section 3 as well as the 25th and 75th percentile of gross nancial assets
of job losers reported by Gruber (2001).19 This gives parameters of EE = 0:9855,  = 0:062,
 = 2,  = 1, 1 = 0:922, 2 = 0:978, 3 = 0:996. As usual, we choose the tax rate  to obtain
budget balance. This results in  = 0:0209.
With heterogeneous preferences, the denition of a welfare measure becomes less straight-
forward. For simplicity, we aggregate welfare using equal weights for all types. Since period
utilities include the factor (1   i) by construction, it is not dicult to see that the rst best
allocation is the same across groups. Hence, preference heterogeneity per se does not create a
motive for redistribution.
Qualitatively, the ndings from Section 3 generalize to the model with heterogeneous dis-
count factors and the resulting higher heterogeneity in assets. In particular, UI benets that
increase with assets continue to be optimal. However, the welfare gain of asset-dependent UI
systems becomes somewhat smaller. We also nd that concave benet functions are far more
benecial than linear ones. Intuitively, by making the benets concave in assets, we can reduce
the degree of redistribution from asset-poor agents to asset-rich agents, but maintain the feature
that asset accumulation is implicitly subsidized (in particular at low asset levels).
The optimal nonlinear asset-dependent policy of the form (7) is given by parameters (1; 2) =
(0:8; 7:737) and creates a steady state welfare gain of 1.14 percent in consumption equivalent
terms. If we take into account the costs of building up the higher asset stock, the optimal pa-
19According to Gruber (2001), the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of the asset distribution (gross nancial
wealth) of job losers are given by asset holdings of 0.1, 1.2 and 7.8, respectively.
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rameters are (1; 2) = (0:3; 40:414), and the welfare gain is 0.30 percent. This policy is highly
concave in assets. The replacement rate is 0.08 for agents with no assets, 0.34 for agents with
assets of 1, and 0.39 for agents with assets of 2, for instance.
4.4 Comparison of results to other quantitative papers
To the best of our knowledge, there is no other quantitative assessment of asset testing in the
unemployment insurance literature. In terms of the setup, however, our basic model is related
to the works by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) and Wang and Williamson (2002).
Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) explore optimal asset-independent UI in a framework where
job oers are not observable and, as in the present paper, agents have access to a savings
technology subject to liquidity constraints. They nd that, depending on the degree of moral
hazard, the optimal replacement rate varies between 15 and 65 percent. The present paper
nds an optimal asset-independent replacement rate of 40 percent, see Section 3.1, which falls
into the range calculated by Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992). Instead of varying the degree of
moral hazard exogenously, we calibrate our model to match empirical ndings on the elasticity
of the job nding rate with respect to UI benets.
Our basic model also has similarities with the setup from Wang and Williamson (2002).
Yet, we follow a very dierent calibration strategy. In particular, we use empirical results on
asset holdings of job losers as the target for the discount factor, whereas Wang and Williamson
(2002) choose a discount factor in line with the real business cycle literature, which results in
asset holdings that are about ve times larger; see our robustness check in Appendix A.1. It
comes as no surprise that the welfare eects of UI are much bigger in the present paper. For
instance, relative to autarky the benchmark UI system raises welfare by a consumption equiva-
lent variation of 0.64 percent in our model, whereas Wang and Williamson (2002) nd welfare
gains of only 0.09 percent. Moreover, the behavioral responses to changes in the replacement
rate are stronger in the present paper. In our model, the unemployment rate in autarky is 34
percent lower than under the benchmark UI system, whereas it falls by only 9 percent in the
setup from Wang and Williamson (2002).
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5 Conclusions
This paper studies the question whether UI benets should depend on individual asset holdings.
We explore this question in a quantitative model where agents face moral hazard during job
search and accumulate a risk-free asset for self-insurance. We nd that the optimal UI program
is one where benets are an increasing function of assets. Intuitively, since liquidity concerns are
crucial for unemployed workers, and since public transfers generally exacerbate moral hazard,
it is expedient to encourage precautionary saving rather than to punish it. In addition, asset-
increasing benets emulate key features of the dynamics of constrained ecient allocations.
Since the asset stock is a summary statistic of the employment history where high assets signal
short unemployment spells, a system where benets increase with assets rewards histories that
are linked to high job search eort in the past.
A few nal remarks seem appropriate. First, it is important to keep in mind that, in line
with most contributions to this literature, there is no heterogeneity of agents with respect to
age or skills/wages in our model. Our results thus show that optimal UI benets should increase
with individual asset holdings conditional on agents being similar in terms of age and wages.
When age or wage heterogeneity are added to the setup, the optimal UI policy will typically
depend on those characteristics. Our analysis then implies that, holding age and wage xed,
an agent with higher asset holdings should receive higher UI benets. The role of asset testing
might change, however, if the UI system does not directly condition on those characteristics,
as assets might then be used as a proxy variable that helps targeting specic subgroups of
the population. Yet, from a normative perspective it would clearly be better to target those
subgroups directly rather than by means of a noisy, endogenous decision variable like assets.
Besides, it is not clear how relevant such reasoning is in the present environment. First of
all, at least when it comes to liquid asset holdings, life cycle motives explain only a relatively
limited fraction of the cross-sectional heterogeneity; compare Gruber (2001).20 Furthermore, it
is common practice in the United States and many other countries to compute UI benets by
using a replacement rate relative to the worker's previous wages. This obviously alleviates the
concern of wage heterogeneity for the design of unemployment insurance.
Secondly, we would like to remark that in practice assets are observable for the UI agency
20Table 4 in Gruber (2001) shows that age does have some predictive power for a worker's gross nancial
wealth; yet there is a large amount of variation of wealth both within young and old workers.
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at a cost only. Even though a precise estimate of this cost seems dicult to obtain, we are
condent that the benet quite plausibly outweighs the cost for two reasons. First of all, the
welfare gain of conditioning UI on assets is substantial and exceeds even the gain of moving
the economy from autarky to the benchmark UI system. Second, under the optimal asset-
dependent UI policy agents have no incentive to underreport assets, but only to overreport,
which is probably easier to detect.
Finally, we would like to comment on the partial equilibrium nature of our model. Clearly,
any policy change that aects aggregate asset holdings will have some consequences for the
equilibrium interest rate. However, since our research question focuses on a particular subgroup
of the population, i.e., workers who face non-negligible job displacement risk and are eligible for
unemployment insurance, and since wealth in the United States is heavily concentrated among
the rich, asset accumulation in our model will have only a very limited impact on the aggregate
capital stock.
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Appendix
A Robustness checks
A.1 Alternative time discount factor
This section explores the consequences of a higher value for , the time discount factor. We
set  = 0:9933, corresponding to an annual factor of approximately 0:92, and re-calibrate
the eciency parameter for job search  in order to match the average job nding rate as
in the benchmark model.21 Since agents are more patient, asset holdings are higher than in
the benchmark model (median assets are 4:3 as opposed to 1:2), implying that agents have a
much better consumption smoothing capacity. This reduces the relative change in marginal
utility during unemployment expressed in formula (5) quite substantially (the new value is
0.27 as opposed to 0.64). To align the change in marginal utility during unemployment with
the estimation by Chetty (2008), one would have to increase the coecient of risk aversion.
However, this would increase asset holdings and bring us even further away from the empirical
ndings on asset holdings by Gruber (2001). Hence, when agents are substantially more patient
than in the benchmark setup, we did not nd parameter combinations that were able to jointly
match all calibration targets.
Nonetheless, as a sensitivity check to our results, we repeat the policy experiment from Sec-
tion 3 for this setup. As usual, the status quo is the case of an asset-independent replacement
rate of 50 percent and we x the budget balancing tax rate,  = 0:0205, from this economy. Us-
ing the functional form described in Section 3.3, we rst compute the nonlinear asset-dependent
benet function that maximizes steady state welfare. We then compute the optimal nonlinear
benet function when the costs of changing the steady state asset stock are taken into ac-
count as in Section 4.1. The results can be found in Table 9 and show that asset-increasing UI
systems generate welfare improvements, which conrms the results from the benchmark cali-
bration. Compared to the benchmark calibration, the welfare gains are somewhat higher when
comparing steady states and somewhat lower when taking transition costs into account.
21In the calibration,  changes from 0:0472 in the benchmark model to 0:0665. The parameters EE , ,  are
set to the same levels as in the benchmark case.
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Table 9: Welfare eects of nonlinear asset-dependent unemployment benets when asset hold-
ings are higher than in the benchmark calibration
transition costs 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
no 2.6 13.884 10.73 6.0% 2.15%
yes 2.2 15.710 7.26 5.1% 0.24%
A.2 Alternative social assistance systems
In the benchmark calibration, we set social assistance benets to 8 percent of after-tax labor
income, in line with OECD ndings on replacement rates for long-term unemployment in the
United States. In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results with respect to alternative
specications of the social assistance system.
We rst analyze a case where the social assistance level is more generous. We set z =
0:15(1   )w and re-calibrate the time discount factor  and the eciency parameter for job
search  in order to match median asset holdings of job losers and the average job nding rate
as in the benchmark model. Since the preference parameters  and  are chosen to match
targets related to the UI system, and since these statistics remain almost unchanged, we refrain
from recalibrating these parameters.22 We then explore the introduction of nonlinear asset-
dependent UI benets. We start from the benchmark economy with a replacement rate of 50
percent and, as before, we x the budget balancing tax rate from this economy, which in this
case is  = 0:0218. Two welfare measures are considered. First, we compare steady state
welfare. Second, we take into account the costs of changing the steady state asset stock as in
Section 4.1.
Our second experiment abolishes the social assistance system and considers a situation where
unemployment benets are paid indenitely.23 Again, we recalibrate the parameters  and  to
match median asset holdings of job losers and the average job nding rate, and we x the budget
balancing tax rate given by  = 0:0262.24 We then compute the welfare eects of introducing
nonlinear asset-dependent UI benets using the two welfare measures discussed in the previous
paragraph. Table 10 presents the optimal policies of the dierent experiments.
The results in Table 10 are derived using re-calibrated parameters, so they are not directly
22In the calibration,  changes from 0:0472 in the benchmark case to 0:0528 and  changes from 0:974 in the
benchmark case to 0:9794.
23In terms of our model parameters, we set 1  p to 10 7.
24The calibration results in  = 0:102 and  = 0:9905.
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Table 10: Welfare eects of nonlinear asset-dependent unemployment benets given higher
social assistance benets or unlimited duration of unemployment benets
experiment transition costs 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
higher level no 2.1 4.974 3.40 6.2% 1.38%
higher level yes 2.2 5.290 2.97 5.5% 0.67%
unlimited duration no 0.8 7.215 4.32 5.3% 1.22%
unlimited duration yes 1.2 9.878 4.44 4.4% 0.34%
comparable to the benchmark model. Nonetheless, the results show that the welfare gains of
asset-increasing UI benets in the benchmark calibration are robust to alternative specications
of the social assistance system. It is worth noting that job nding rates in the social assistance
state are particularly high, so that only a very small fraction of the population is in this highly
transitory state.25 Hence, the robustness of our results along this dimension does not come as
a surprise.
A.3 Higher asset holdings
In the benchmark economy, the calibration target for asset holdings is median liquid asset
holdings (gross nancial wealth) of job losers reported by Gruber (2001). As a sensitivity check
to our results, we recalibrate the parameters of the model so that job losers have median assets
of 2.6, which is approximately twice as much as in the benchmark economy. This generates
parameters EE = 0:9855,  = 0:0425,  = 0:98,  = 2:8,  = 1. The tax rate is xed at
 = 0:0211 and balances the government's budget.
Using the functional form from Section 3.3, we rst compute the nonlinear asset-dependent
benet function that maximizes steady state welfare. We then compute the optimal nonlinear
benet function when the costs of changing the steady state asset stock are taken into account
as in Section 4.1. The results can be found in Table 11 and show that the welfare gains of
asset-increasing UI systems are of a similar magnitude as in the benchmark calibration.
Table 11: Welfare eects of nonlinear asset-dependent unemployment benets when asset
holdings are higher than in the benchmark calibration
transition costs 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
no 2.5 7.022 5.30 6.5% 1.23%
yes 2.5 7.521 4.67 5.6% 0.55%
25In the benchmark economy 1:2 percent of agents are in the social assistance state.
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A.4 Relaxed borrowing constraints
In this section, we explore an alternative value for the agent's borrowing constraint. We set
a =  1 and recalibrate the model to match the same targets as in the benchmark setup. This
generates parameters EE = 0:9855,  = 0:0405,  = 0:9755,  = 2:75,  = 1. The tax rate
is  = 0:0212 and balances the government's budget. Analogous to the analysis from Section
3.3, we compute the nonlinear asset-dependent benet function that maximizes steady state
welfare. We also compute the optimal benet function when the costs of changing the steady
state asset stock are taken into account. The results are given in Table 12. Since the parameters
of the model are re-calibrated, the results are not directly comparable to the benchmark setup.
However, the results allow us to conclude that the sizable welfare gains of asset-dependent UI
systems in the benchmark setup are not an artifact of the particular choice of the borrowing
constraint.
Table 12: Welfare eects of nonlinear asset-dependent unemployment benets when borrowing
constraints are less tight
transition costs 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
no 2.2 6.164 3.55 6.5% 1.24%
yes 2.2 6.680 3.09 5.6% 0.64%
B The role of benet dynamics
This section explores the importance of linking unemployment benets to the duration of the
unemployment spell. More specically, we compare the welfare eects of an optimal one-stage
unemployment benet system to an optimal two-stage system. In the one-stage system, unem-
ployment benets are paid indenitely, which implies that social assistance transfers become
irrelevant. The two-stage system consists of one benet level for the rst few months of un-
employment and a second benet level for the remainder, with an indenite duration as in
the one-stage system. The second stage hence resembles the social assistance system from the
benchmark economy. The transition from the rst to the second stage is stochastic, and the gov-
ernment chooses the expected duration (or transition probability) of the rst stage of benets
as well as the two respective benet levels.
We x the tax rate at the benchmark level of  = 0:0211 and explore a wide range of
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policy parameters. We ensure that the government budget is balanced, which takes away
one degree of freedom from the choice of policy parameters and automatically pins down the
benet level of the one-stage system. The optimal policies can be found in Table 13. We see
that the optimal two-stage system consists of a replacement rate of 47 percent in the rst 2
months of unemployment, followed by a replacement rate of 28 percent for the remainder of
the unemployment spell. Hence, compared to the benchmark economy, the optimal two-stage
system has a shorter duration of the rst stage and more generous benets during the second
stage. Relative to the one-stage system, which features a replacement rate of 32 percent, the
two-stage system yields a welfare gain of less than 0.06 percent in consumption equivalent
terms. Hence, in our experiment the dynamics of unemployment benets do not yield large
welfare gains. Similar results have been derived for more exible dynamic benet systems in
related environments by Wang and Williamson (2002) and Shimer and Werning (2008).
Table 13: Steady states for optimal one-stage and two-stage insurance systems
system rst stage second stage duration assets unemployment welfare change
benchmark 0.50 0.08 6 1.13 5.1% 0.00%
one-stage 0.32 0.32 1 0.92 6.2% 0.16%
two-stage 0.47 0.28 2 0.83 5.7% 0.21%
Notes: The rst column describes the policy type, the second and third column denote the replacement
rate in the rst and second stage of benets, respectively, and the fourth column denotes the expected
potential duration of the rst stage (in months).
C Asset-dependent benets for dierent tax rates
This section explores nonlinear asset-dependent UI benets for dierent tax rates. Table 14
displays the steady states that result when the parameters for the nonlinear benet function
are chosen optimally given the tax rate. We note that, not surprisingly, the unemployment rate
is increasing in the tax rate. Welfare is non-monotonic in the tax rate and is maximized when
the tax rate is at the benchmark level,  = 0:0211.
D Computation
This section sketches how we solve the agent's problem and nd the stationary distribution and
the optimal policy parameters of the UI system. Since we use standard numerical techniques,
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Table 14: Steady states for nonlinear asset-dependent replacement rates. The parameters of
the benet function are chosen optimally given the tax rate.
taxes 1 2 assets unemployment welfare change
1.00% 2.6 5.396 3.00 5.2% 1.20%
1.50% 2.2 5.161 3.26 5.8% 1.48%
2.00% 2.0 4.859 3.43 6.3% 1.56%
2.11% 2.0 4.815 3.48 6.5% 1.56%
2.50% 1.9 4.577 3.54 6.9% 1.51%
3.00% 1.8 4.258 3.57 7.4% 1.34%
we will outline only the general steps of the computation.
We study benet schedules that are dierentiable in assets (Assumption 3) and assume that
rst-order conditions are sucient for the solution of the agent's problem. We verify numerically
that this is indeed the case by re-optimizing the agent's decision using grid search and value
function iteration. The agent's rst-order conditions are straightforward to derive. The agent's
eort decision is characterized by the following condition:
0(e) = 0E(e)v(a
0; E) + 0U (e)v(a
0; U) + 0S(e)v(a
0; S);
where v(a; ) denotes the value function in employment state  when the agent holds assets
a. The value function is derived using standard value function iteration on equation (4). The
rst-order condition for the optimal asset choice is also straightforward to derive. Due to asset-
testing, the condition involves a state dependent return,
u0(c) = 

E(e)(1 + r)u
0(c0E) + U (e)(1 + r + b
0(a0))u0(c0U ) + S(e)(1 + r)u
0(c0S)

where c0E ; c
0
U ; c
0
S denote the agent's consumption in the next period in states E;U; S, respectively.
We restrict attention to recursive policy functions, so that nding the optimal policy function
is equivalent to nding a xed point to the rst-order conditions. We start with an initial guess
for policy functions c(a; ) and e(a; ) that we specify on an equally spaced grid of asset states
and use linear interpolation in between. We use the rst-order conditions to update the initial
guess and iterate until convergence. We also update the value function in equation (4) during
the updating procedure for the policy functions.
To derive the stationary distribution of the economy, we approximate a transition function
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on the same grid of asset states and use the eigenvector to the largest eigenvalue. Given a
stationary distribution over asset and employment states, it is straightforward to compute the
government budget. We use bisection on a grid of tax rates or benet function parameters
to achieve budget balance. For the transition in Section 4.1, we compute the steady state
asset stocks of the benchmark economy and the economy with asset-dependent benets, and
add the transition costs to the government budget. Note that transition costs in this case are
endogenous, but the bisection algorithm can still be applied. For the transition experiment
described in Section 4.2, we start with an initial guess for policy parameters (possibly including
an initial transfer) and iterate forward using the transition function until the steady state of the
economy with asset-dependent benets is reached. We use linear interpolation for the transition
function, too. We check budget balance including the transition and update the government's
policy parameters again using bisection until budget balance is reached. Note that policy
functions are stationary throughout the transition, because they only depend on the individual
states and the UI system, which is constant during the transition.
For the optimal choice of policy parameters, we apply grid search on a pre-specied grid of
policy parameters. We compute the steady state for each parameter combination and choose the
one that yields the highest welfare. In cases where we also consider the transition, we compare
welfare at the onset of the transition.
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E Figures
Figure 1: Benchmark economy (replacement rate 0.5)
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nding probability
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Notes: The upper left panel shows the consumption policy as a function of assets. The upper right panel
shows job nding rates as a function of assets. The lower panel displays the asset distribution. In all
three plots the red solid line represents employed workers, the blue dashed line represents unemployed
workers who receive UI benets, and the green dashed dotted line represents unemployed workers who
receive social assistance benets.
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Figure 2: Optimal linear asset-dependent UI system
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(a) UI benets
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(b) rate of return on assets
Notes: The left panel shows the after-tax wage for the employed (red solid line), unemployment insurance
benets (blue dashed line), and social assistance benets (green dashed dotted line). The right panel
shows the technological interest rate (red solid line) and the implied total interest rate (red dashed line)
for employed agents when taking the marginal eect of assets on unemployment benets into account.
Figure 3: Optimal linear asset-dependent UI system
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nding probability
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Notes: The upper left panel shows the consumption policy as a function of assets. The upper right panel
shows job nding rates as a function of assets. The lower panel displays the asset distribution. In all
three plots the red solid line represents employed workers, the blue dashed line represents unemployed
workers who receive UI benets, and the green dashed dotted line represents unemployed workers who
receive social assistance benets.
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Figure 4: Optimal nonlinear asset-dependent UI system
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
(a) UI benets
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 x 10
−3
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ective rate of return on assets
Notes: The left panel shows the after-tax wage for the employed (red solid line), unemployment insurance
benets (blue dashed line), and social assistance benets (green dashed dotted line). The right panel
shows the technological interest rate (red solid line) and the implied total interest rate (red dashed line)
for employed agents when taking the marginal eect of assets on unemployment benets into account.
Figure 5: Optimal nonlinear asset-dependent UI system
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Notes: The left panel shows the after-tax wage for the employed (red solid line), unemployment insurance
benets (blue dashed line), and social assistance benets (green dashed dotted line). The right panel
shows the technological interest rate (red solid line) and the eective interest rate (red dashed line) for
employed agents in this economy.
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